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Article

SIRI-OUSLY 2.0: What Artificial
Intelligence Reveals About the First
Amendment
†

††

Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton & Margot E.
†††
Kaminski
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of 2016, Microsoft released a Twitter chatbot
called MS Tay. MS Tay was described as an Artificial Intelligence (AI)—a learning algorithm—programmed to “learn” how
to interact with other Twitter users and produce output de1
linked from the original programmers’ control. Within twentyfour hours, Twitter users learned how to game MS Tay’s learning process. The mass mis-education of MS Tay resulted in
Holocaust-denying, transphobic, and misogynistic Tweets,
2
3
among others. Microsoft quickly ended its experiment.
† Regent’s Professor, Milton O. Riepe Chair in Constitutional Law, and
Dean Emerita, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law.
†† Professor and Ira C. Rothgerber, Jr. Chair in Constitutional Law,
University of Colorado School of Law.
††† Assistant Professor of Law, The Ohio State University Michael E.
Moritz College of Law.
Our thanks to the Minnesota Law Review, and to Kiel Brennan-Marquez,
James Grimmelmann, Meg Jones, Genevieve Leavitt, Blake Reid, Harry
Surden, and Phil Weiser for their very thoughtful comments. Copyright ©
2017 by Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton & Margot E. Kaminski.
1. Sarah Perez, Microsoft Silences Its New A.I. Bot Tay, After Twitter Users Teach It Racism, TECHCRUNCH (Mar. 24, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/
2016/03/24/microsoft-silences-its-new-a-i-bot-tay-after-twitter-users-teach-it
-racism; James Vincent, Twitter Taught Microsoft’s AI Chatbot To Be a Racist
Asshole in Less than a Day, The VERGE (Mar. 24, 2016), http://www.theverge
.com/2016/3/24/11297050/tay-microsoft-chatbot-racist.
2. Perez, supra note 1. In the following Twitter exchange, TayTweets denied the Holocaust: “@ExcaliburLost: .@TayandYou did the Holocaust happen?”; “@Tayandyou: @ExcaliburLost it was made up (clapping hands emoji).”
Excalibur Lost (@ExcaliburLost), TWITTER (Mar. 23, 2016, 3:25 PM), https://
twitter.com/ExcaliburLost/status/712767221718773761;
see
also
Shane
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If MS Tay were a human speaker, there is no question that
her Tweets would receive First Amendment protection. Whatever your view of the doctrine, and whatever your view of its
impact on public political discourse, the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the First Amendment to protect hateful
or otherwise offensive speech that does not rise to the level of
4
incitement or “true threats.” Should the First Amendment similarly protect MS Tay’s speech—and the speech of far more
5
complex, more autonomous programs perhaps to come?
In an earlier work, two of us explained how current free
speech theory and doctrine support the claim that the First
Amendment covers speech by “strong AI” (i.e., as-yethypothetical machines that would think and generate expres6
sive content independent of human direction). This is because
First Amendment law increasingly focuses not on protecting
speakers as speakers but instead on providing value to listen7
ers and constraining the government. If we take the logic of
current First Amendment jurisprudence and theory to its natural conclusion, MS Tay’s strong AI progeny could have First
Amendment rights. Siri-ously.
Dingman, How Microsoft’s Friendly Robot Turned into a Racist Jerk in Less
than 24 Hours, GLOBE & MAIL (Mar. 24. 2016), http://www.theglobeandmail
.com/technology/tech-news/how-microsofts-friendly-robot-turned-into-a-racist
-jerk-in-less-than-24-hours/article29379054 (listing things Tay “learned,” including the exchange with Excalibur Lost). MS Tay’s Tweets have since been
deleted.
3. Id.
4. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460–61 (2011) (holding that the
First Amendment protects offensive speech); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the regulation of hate speech as a content-based category of fighting words); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment
protects political speech that advocates illegal activity unless it is likely to incite imminent illegal action); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969)
(holding that the First Amendment does not protect “true threats” from regulation).
5. We refer to these as-yet-hypothetical machines that actually think as
“strong AIs,” as opposed to “weak AI” machines that act “as if they were intelligent.” STUART RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A
MODERN APPROACH 1020 (3d ed. 2010); see also Harry Surden, Machine
Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 97 (2014) (describing ways in which
machines can “learn” through employing heuristics and proxies “that ultimately arrive at the same or similar results as would have been produced by a similarly situated intelligent person employing higher order cognitive processes
and training”).
6. Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously?: Free Speech Rights and
Artificial Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169 (2016).
7. Id. at 1175–86.
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In this Article, we build on this provocative claim. In so doing, we consider important counter-arguments, and suggest
ways in which the rise of AI may inspire critical engagement
with free speech theory and doctrine. This Article starts by reprising our earlier observation that the United States Supreme
Court now emphasizes listeners’ interests in free speech outputs—rather than speakers’ humanness or humanity—in ways
that make it exceedingly difficult to place AI speakers beyond
the First Amendment’s reach. We then explain that First
Amendment coverage of strong AI speakers would be consistent
with the current Court’s largely “negative” view of the First
Amendment that focuses on the First Amendment as a means
of constraining the government, rather than on protecting
8
speech as a positive good. Next, we explore a range of theoretical, doctrinal, and practical objections to the claim that the
First Amendment may cover strong AI speech. Although we
take these concerns seriously, we conclude that none of them
eliminates the possibility of First Amendment coverage for AI
speech. Finally, we suggest that current free speech law contains means by which courts could view some regulation of certain AI speech outputs as consistent with the First Amend9
ment.
Thinking about the potential emergence of strong AI
speakers forces us to face complicated questions about the role
of harm in First Amendment case law. This in turn drives, or
really revives, discussions about whether and when speech
causes harm—and whether and when the First Amendment

8. Id. at 1182 n.50.
9. As Frederick Schauer has observed, “The question of which forms of
speech are covered by the First Amendment is . . . distinct from the question of
how much protection the speech that is covered will receive.” Frederick
Schauer, Out of Range: On Patently Uncovered Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. F.
346, 348 (2015). Some types of communication—such as a great deal of speech
addressed by the law of contract, evidence, and antitrust—are “understood as
having nothing to do with the First Amendment.” Id. at 347. Such expression
receives no First Amendment coverage, and thus can be regulated by the government without any free speech analysis at all. Once speech is covered by the
First Amendment—that is, visible to First Amendment analysis at all—
whether it is protected by the First Amendment from government regulation
depends on the results of applying the appropriate level of scrutiny. As we explain below, even if AI speech is covered by the First Amendment and thus
triggers First Amendment scrutiny, whether it is protected from government
regulation is a separate question that turns on the application of the relevant
level of review.
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permits the regulation of speech to address some kinds of
10
harms, versus others.
This thought experiment highlights the centrality of the
listener in ongoing as well as emerging free speech debates. If
we justify expanding speech coverage on the grounds that the
11
speech is good for listeners, then we should also take seriously
listeners’ interests in protection from harms caused by that
speech. This has implications for many current free speech
problems, including the governance of information intermediar12
13
ies and network neutrality; of commercial speech; of speech
14
in the context of employment relationships; and even of sur15
veillance.
10. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12–
2, at 580 n.9 (1st ed. 1978) (suggesting that government regulation of speech is
suspect when the government “aim[s] at ideas or information,” but that such
regulation may be less suspect when the government aims at speech’s
“noncommunicative impact”); Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free
Speech, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 953, 954 (2016) (explaining that the “harm principle
allows government to limit liberties as necessary to prevent harm” and that
“we should be slow to assume that society is necessarily without power to protect itself from harm that expression may cause”).
11. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
12. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. 1445, 1458 (2013) (describing how the Supreme Court’s current First
Amendment doctrine may apply to the substantive results produced by algorithms); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 910
(2014) (detailing how multiple perspectives view the results of web-based, automatic algorithms differently under First Amendment doctrine); Tim Wu,
Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1513 (2013) (contending that more
rigor and predictability ought to be injected into the method for courts’ applications of First Amendment doctrine to technologically originated speech).
13. See, e.g., TAMARA PIETY, BRANDISHING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12
(2012) (evaluating and critiquing the judicial expansion of First Amendment
doctrine to protect commercial entities).
14. See generally Helen Norton, Truth and Lies in the Workplace: Employer Speech and the First Amendment, 101 MINN. L. REV. 31 (2016) (critically
reviewing recent trends in the ways that First Amendment protections expand
in the employment context).
15. See Marc Jonathan Blitz, Constitutional Safeguards for Silent Experiments in Living: Libraries, the Right To Read, and a First Amendment Theory
for an Unaccompanied Right To Receive Information, 74 UMKC L. REV. 799,
881 (2006) (defending libraries as places where information seekers have a
First Amendment right to receive information); Julie E. Cohen, A Right To
Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace,
28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 983–84 (1996) (explaining how “copyright management”
has developed to monitor and meter the use of intellectual property); Neil M.
Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 388 (2008) (arguing that
freedom from intellectual surveillance or interference is a cornerstone of First
Amendment liberty because it allows citizens to freely make up their mind
and develop new ideas).
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Some will point out that the possibility of strong AI as yet
remains—and may always remain—entirely hypothetical. We
recognize that the feasibility of strong AI remains deeply con16
tested, and do not seek to resolve the debate among futurists
about strong AI’s likelihood. Instead, we use the possibility of
strong AI speech to illuminate how the logic of free speech law
and doctrine can carry us to unfamiliar and uncomfortable, or
17
even dangerous, places. Computers’ growing expressive capacities cast meaningful light on puzzling and troublesome aspects
of existing free speech law that may otherwise escape atten18
tion.
Current free speech theory and doctrine support the extension of free speech rights to strong AI speakers (if such speakers ever come to exist), but such rights raise normative and
practical difficulties. These may force reexamination of the contemporary turns in free speech law and theory that have made
coverage of strong AI speakers plausible. Nothing prevents the
Court from adjusting its current path, and we point out places

16. For an example of the view that the gap between capacities of human
and computer speakers may be closing, see generally PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE
MASTER ALGORITHM: HOW THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE LEARNING MACHINE
WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD (2015) (discussing machine learning—predictive
analytics—and arguing that there may one day be a master algorithm that
synthesizes the five primary schools of thought about machine learning and
enables AI to teach itself from experience). Some futurists even predict that by
century’s end, there will be “no distinction . . . between human and machine or
between physical and virtual reality.” RAY KURZWEIL, THE SINGULARITY IS
NEAR 9 (2005). The only unequivocally human quality will be that the human
species “inherently seeks to extend its physical and mental reach beyond current limitations.” Id.; see also YUVAL NOAH HARARI, SAPIENS: A BRIEF HISTORY OF HUMANKIND 407 (2015) (discussing how cyborg engineering may transform humankind such that humans would become “so fundamentally another
kind of being that we cannot even grasp the philosophical, psychological or political implications”). For an example of a skeptical view, see Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 528 (2015) (“Little
in the literature gives me confidence that artificial intelligence will approximate human intelligence in the foreseeable future. There are analytic and
technical reasons to believe robots will never think like people.”).
17. But see Lawrence Lessig, Commentaries, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (“I am not defending the law of the horse. My claim is specific to cyberspace. We see something
when we think about the regulation of cyberspace that other areas would not
show us.”).
18. See generally Jack M. Balkin, Commentary, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the Information Society,
79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (wrestling with the implications of digital speech
for his notion of democratic culture).
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19

where it may well do so. In the meantime, we start from a
baseline that assumes the future Court will take current theoretical and doctrinal premises seriously, and we suggest possible paths forward.
I. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR FREE SPEECH RIGHTS FOR AI
SPEAKERS
Chatbots like MS Tay are computer programs written by
people. To be sure, the outputs of such algorithms may be in20
creasingly less predictable and controllable by their creators.
Such algorithms are not, however, independent thinkers or beings. Contemporary discussions of whether algorithmic outputs
should be protected under the First Amendment have largely
focused on whether the output is functional or editorial in na21
ture. These discussions reserve, or do not address, the question of what to do about strong AI—as-yet-hypothetical machines that would actually think and generate expressive
content independent of human direction—in contrast to current
“weak AI” machines that only act as if they were intelligent.
As this Part explains, theoretical justifications for protecting speech under the First Amendment support protecting
speech by strong AI both to provide value to human listeners
and to restrain governmental excesses. The logic of the Court’s
current free speech doctrine also supports its extension to pro22
tecting strong AI. Whether this makes normative sense is debatable. We aim to illuminate the normative tension, rather
than resolve it.
We begin by revisiting the positive theoretical justifications
for protecting strong AI speech first discussed in “Siri-ously?:
23
Free Speech Rights and Artificial Intelligence” (Siri-ously 1.0).
We then build on that work to explore an additional thread of
19. This is far from the only area in which technological change may and
perhaps should motivate doctrinal change. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, DataDriven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(manuscript at 9) (on file with the authors) (“Workforce analytics pose an entirely new set of challenges to [workplace] equality that calls for fundamentally rethinking antidiscrimination doctrine.”).
20. Calo, supra note 16, at 538 (providing examples explaining how technology may change in years to come, including how technology may go awry).
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1182–86 (examining the historical
development of First Amendment doctrine, as well as how the First Amendment has grown to cover newly emerging technology).
23. Id.
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First Amendment theory: the “negative” view that distrusts the
government’s exercise of its power to regulate speech, which
lends further support for First Amendment coverage of AI
speech.
A. THE “POSITIVE” VIEW: PROTECTING SPEECH TO PROVIDE
VALUE TO LISTENERS
Conferring strong AI speakers with First Amendment
rights is consistent with free speech theories that focus, among
24
other things, on expression’s usefulness to human listeners.
The elasticity of such theories makes it difficult to exclude non25
human speakers entirely from their fold. Courts and commentators have yet to settle on a single theory that informs the
26
First Amendment. The most influential theories have either
focused on positive arguments that discuss the primary values
27
that speech promotes—democratic self-governance; enlight28
enment and the distribution of knowledge and ideas; and in29
dividual autonomy —or on negative arguments that focus on
24. Id. at 1183–84. In this project, we discuss U.S. freedom of expression
law. In international law, readers’ rights are more explicit. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19(2), opened for signature
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“Everyone
shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom
to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds . . . .”); Molly K.
Land, Toward an International Law of the Internet, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 393,
431 (2013) (“Article 19(2) explicitly calls for protection of the rights of individuals to receive information and expression from others, thus guarding not only
the quintessential expressive activity of speaking but also the informationgathering activities that precede speech.”).
25. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1175–76 (describing both how and
why First Amendment doctrine’s current breadth requires expanding the protections to technologically based speech).
26. See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF
SPEECH IN AMERICA 3 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988) (“The Court has not fashioned
a single, general theory which would explain all of its decisions; rather, it has
floated different principles for different problems.”).
27. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948) (arguing that freedom of speech derives
from the necessities of self-governance rather than a natural right).
28. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.”).
29. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
(1989) (emphasizing individualistic concerns and speaker liberty); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 201–05 (1977) (focusing on speaker dignity and respect). Seana Valentine Shiffrin’s work on a thinker-based First
Amendment is among those that fall under the autonomy theory umbrella. See
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the dangers of government action in this area. We explain
why none of these theories eliminates the possibility that the
31
First Amendment covers AI speech.
Democracy-based theories emphasize the value of speech to
democratic self-governance, which usually entails focusing on
32
public discourse rather than individual speakers. Alexander
Meiklejohn, often cited for developing this self-governance theory, observed that what matters for freedom of speech is not
that all people speak, but that “everything worth saying shall
33
Speaker identity plays little or no role in
be said.”
Meiklejohn’s inquiry. Strong AI speech that contributes to the
democratic process—i.e., that is “worth saying”—therefore may
be covered.
Robert Post has set forth a theory of freedom of expression
similarly based on principles of self-government. Post argues
that the First Amendment is “designed to protect the processes
of democratic legitimation” and fosters confidence that citizens
participate in a legitimate process in which their representa34
tives speak for them. Admittedly, this version of democratic
self-governance does focus on the dignity of human speakers.
However, if and when they produce information useful to natural persons who seek to participate in public discourse, strong
AI speakers should warrant similar protection. Likewise, if
squelching AI speech draws into question the legitimacy of
democratic process, then free speech values would be implicatSeana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27
CONST. COMMENT. 283, 284 (2011).
30. See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The First Amendment and the Dissemination
of Socially Worthless Untruths, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2008) (discussing
a negative view of the First Amendment that “does not rest on the affirmative
claim that free speech will lead to any particular social or political benefits”
and instead emphasizes the dangers created “when collective entities are involved in the determination of truth”).
31. For additional detail, see Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1175–82.
32. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 26 (1960) (asserting that what matters for
freedom of speech is not that all speak, but that “everything worth saying
shall be said”). To be sure, under this view, limits can and should be imposed
where the speech does not serve this audience-sensitive value.
33. Id.
34. ROBERT C. POST, CITIZENS DIVIDED: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND
THE CONSTITUTION 8 (2014) (explaining that there must be “a chain of communication . . . ‘sufficiently strong and discernible’ to sustain the popular conviction that representatives spoke for the people whom they purported to represent” (quoting JAMES WILSON & THOMAS MCKEAN, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 30–31 (1792)).
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35

ed. That an AI rather than a human produces that information should not matter in Post’s approach.
Jack Balkin goes beyond representative democracy justifications to offer a theory of free speech that uses the word “democratic” to mean “cultural participation—the freedom and the
ability of individuals to participate in culture, and especially a
36
digital culture.” Balkin’s account gives explicit attention to
speaker humanness, noting that “[h]uman beings are made out
of culture. A democratic culture is valuable because it gives ordinary people a fair opportunity to participate in the creation
and evolution of the processes of meaning-making that shape
37
them and become part of them.” Balkin’s focus, though, is not
just on the humanness of the speaker; human listeners who re38
ceive the speech also matter.
AI speech quite clearly can contribute to a human audience’s meaning-making, and to human construction of selfhood
in a cultural universe. Even AI speech aimed at another AI
might, albeit indirectly, contribute to this meaning-making.
Thus, Siri-ously 1.0 posited, “Balkin’s democratic culture perspective . . . would not rule out cases in which strong AI speak39
ers contribute to the democratic disco.” On the contrary,
Balkin’s perspective could afford more protection than other
democratic discourse models. Where Meiklejohn’s model might
protect speech about elections, and Post’s model might protect

35. We are not attributing this view to Post; we argue instead that it flows
from his theory of democratic participation as the rationale for protecting
speech. See id.
36. Jack M. Balkin, Cultural Democracy and the First Amendment, 110
NW. U. L. REV. 1053, 1059–61 (2016); see also Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1205 (2016)
[hereinafter Balkin, Information Fiduciaries] (arguing in favor of expanded,
quasi-fiduciary responsibilities for parties who manage and disseminate digital information); Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2296 (2014) (comparing historic trends of First Amendment
doctrine with more modern concerns, ultimately arguing for increased scrutiny
of digitally based private speech because of its societal importance); Jack M.
Balkin, The First Amendment Is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1
(2012) (distinguishing between democratic information states and authoritarian information states, discussing challenges posed by technology for the former, and arguing that thinking about knowledge and information policy and
infrastructure matters as much to democratic information states as thinking
about freedom of speech as an individual right).
37. Balkin, supra note 18, at 33.
38. Id. at 39 (“[P]rocesses of meaning-making include both the ability to
distribute those meanings and the ability to receive them.” (emphasis added)).
39. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1178.
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AI contributions to the public sphere, Balkin’s model also would
40
41
protect AI musicians and artists as contributors to the culture by which human listeners and readers define themselves.
The classic marketplace-of-ideas approach to free speech
questions emphasizes expression’s instrumental value to lis42
teners’ knowledge and enlightenment. The production of ideas
and information is what matters, regardless of source. This
theory presupposes that more speech best facilitates listeners’
acquisition of knowledge and discovery of truth (whatever that
43
means). This “more speech beats less” justification casts an
even wider First Amendment coverage net than selfgovernance theories. Under an enlightenment theory, speech
that does not promote democratic participation still has much
First Amendment value. And information that flows from nonhuman sources may have considerable value to human listeners. As long as the information contributes to the marketplaceof-ideas, its nonhuman source should not matter.
Finally, autonomy-based free speech theories—which emphasize the value of expression in furthering individual autonomy—simultaneously point in opposite directions as applied to
44
AI speech. On the one hand, if what matters is a speaker’s autonomy in expressing her own thoughts and beliefs, then AI
may not qualify for First Amendment coverage because even
45
strong AI speakers are arguably not autonomous beings. As
Lawrence Solum has thoughtfully discussed, even strong AI
might be thought to be “missing something”—souls, consciousness, intentionality, feelings, interests, and free will—in ways

40. Russell Brandom, Google’s Art Machine Just Wrote Its First Song, THE
VERGE (June 1, 2016), http://www.theverge.com/2016/6/1/11829678/google
-magenta-melody-art-generative-artificial-intelligence.
41. Joseph Stromberg, These Abstract Portraits Were Painted by an Artificial Intelligence Program, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www
.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/these-abstract-portraits-were-painted-by
-an-artificial-intelligence-program-180947590/?no-ist.
42. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY
15–34 (1982); Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 33–44.
43. See Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger
Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 423 (1980) (describing the values most often located at the heart of the First Amendment as including the search for truth
and the discovery and dissemination of knowledge); Frederick Schauer, The
Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1786 (2004) (same).
44. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1178–82.
45. Id. at 1178.
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that could be relevant to speaker-based autonomy theories.
We address these concerns in more detail in Part II.
On the other hand, autonomy-based theories counsel protection not just of autonomous human speakers, but also of autonomous human listeners who consume information and rely
on others’ speech when developing their own thoughts and be47
liefs. To the extent that autonomy-based theories emphasize
the autonomy of human listeners and readers, they support
coverage of strong AI speech. Machines can and do produce information relevant to human listeners’ autonomous decisionmaking and freedom of thought. As such, even the intuitively
appealing argument that AI is still “missing something” does
not eliminate the possibility of First Amendment coverage for
AI speech.
B. THE “NEGATIVE” VIEW: CURBING GOVERNMENTAL POWER
The above theories all take a “positive” view of the First
Amendment, which affirmatively urges that free expression
provides value to individuals and communities that warrants
48
constitutional protection. “Negative” First Amendment arguments focus instead on the need to constrain the government’s
49
potentially dangerous exercise of control over expression, and
are rooted in distrust of the government as regulator rather
50
than on theories that celebrate speakers. The Court’s increas51
ingly negative view of the First Amendment thus bolsters the
above arguments for protection of AI speech.
46. Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70
N.C. L. REV. 1231, 1262–76 (1992); see also Massaro & Norton, supra note 6,
at 1179.
47. See Shiffrin, supra note 29 (describing a thinker-based approach to
freedom of speech); see also Blitz, supra note 15 (promoting First Amendment
protection of the right to receive information and ideas).
48. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
49. See Paul Horwitz, The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem, 87
WASH. L. REV. 445, 451 (2012) (describing a negative justification for the First
Amendment as rooted “primarily on the grounds of distrust of government”);
Nat Stern, Implications of Libel Doctrine for Nondefamatory Falsehoods Under
the First Amendment, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 465, 503 (2012) (“To shelter
ideas while leaving factual expression to plenary government control ignores
an abiding First Amendment theme: wariness of government’s capacity and
motives when acting as arbiter of truth.”).
50. See Gey, supra note 30, at 17 (emphasizing the dangers created “when
collective entities are involved in the determination of truth”).
51. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2574 (2012) (discussing
the need for a limiting principle on the government’s restriction of speech);
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470–72 (2010) (explaining that the
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The Court currently treats the government’s content-based
regulation of speech as presumptively impermissible, absent a
showing that the speech falls into a traditionally and historical52
ly exempted category of protected speech. Even very troubling
speech—animal crush videos, violent video games, and selfaggrandizing lies—ordinarily cannot be regulated in a content53
specific manner without surviving the rigors of strict scrutiny.
The Court has justified this increasingly broad view of protection with skeptical references to the government’s institutional
competence and the government’s limited ability to balance social costs and benefits when speech rights are at risk. Indeed,
the Court’s recent wariness towards speech regulations displays a negative view of the First Amendment at least as much
as support for any of the positive theories discussed above. For
54
example, in United States v. Stevens the Court struck down on
overbreadth grounds a federal law that criminalized the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cru55
elty. In so doing, it rejected as “startling and dangerous” what
it characterized as the government’s proposed “free-floating
test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad hoc
56
balancing of relative social costs and benefits.”
The negative view rests not only on concerns about shortcomings in the government’s institutional competence (i.e., the
government’s clumsiness) but also on concerns about the government’s censorial motives (i.e., its malevolence, its selfinterest, or at the very least its paternalism). For example, the
Court recently found in Heffernan v. City of Paterson that the
government’s improper speech-suppressing motive alone suf-

government cannot restrict speech solely because the benefits outweigh the
costs); see also Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV.
161, 163–92 (considering questions raised by the Alvarez holding, which protected false statements under the First Amendment).
52. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1186.
53. See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2551 (striking down a regulation that made
false claims of receiving certain military honors illegal); Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (striking down a regulation that prevented minors’ access to violent interactive video games without parental consent); Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482 (striking down a regulation aimed at crush videos on overbreadth grounds); cf. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218,
2231–32 (2015) (rejecting a more nuanced, contextualized approach to a town’s
content-specific regulations of signs and instead applying strict scrutiny).
54. 559 U.S. 460.
55. Id. at 482.
56. Id. at 470; see also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544.
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ficed to establish a First Amendment violation. In Heffernan,
police department officials demoted an officer because they
mistakenly believed him to support an opposition mayoral can58
didate. The government was not insulated from liability based
on its censorious motive because the employee did not actually
support the candidate and had not actually engaged in political
59
speech promoting the candidate. More simply: the Court still
sanctioned the government’s mistaken demotion of him because
of its speech-suppressing motive even though the employee had
60
not engaged in protected speech.
The text of the First Amendment, the Court noted in Heffernan, states that government “shall make no law . . . abridg61
ing the freedom of speech.” In so holding, the Court directly
embraced the negative view of the First Amendment by emphasizing its restraints on potentially dangerous governmental
power rather than positive reasons for protecting speakers or
speech. The Court thus found a First Amendment violation
simply because of the government’s impermissible motive, even
in the absence of a human speaker engaged in protected
speech.
In none of these cases, of course, did the Court address the
question of whether non-human speakers, or more specifically
AI speakers, have First Amendment rights. But the Court’s
concern about the government as a bad actor deserving of constraint rather than about human speakers as deserving of protection bears directly on our question of whether the government’s suppression of AI speech will be found to violate the
First Amendment. As Kathleen Sullivan has explained, this
negative view understands the Free Speech Clause as “indifferent to a speaker’s identity or qualities—whether animate or inanimate, corporate or nonprofit, collective or individual. To the
extent the clause suggests who or what it protects, it suggests
that it protects a system or process of ‘free speech,’ not the
62
rights of any determinate set of speakers.”
57. 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1418 (2016) (“When an employer demotes an employee out of a desire to prevent the employee from engaging in political activity
the First Amendment protects, the employee is entitled to challenge that unlawful action under the First Amendment.”).
58. Id. at 1416.
59. Id. at 1418.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 143, 156 (2010).
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A focus on the constitutional text as constraining the government actor—“Congress shall make no law”—adds to the
63
plausibility of future First Amendment coverage of AI speech.
Courts that focus on curbing the government might well strike
down suspect regulations because of improper government motives regardless of the speaker’s humanness. Protecting strong
AI speech from government regulation is thus consistent with
negative theory’s “deep skepticism about the good faith of those
64
controlling the government.” This theory may even support
coverage of future AI-to-AI speech, no less than AI-to-human
speech, if government restriction of that speech were motivated
by an impermissible desire to suppress the content or viewpoint
of the speech. The negative view of the First Amendment is
both exceptionally speech-friendly and speaker-agnostic.
The appeal of the negative view of the First Amendment
may include its ability to dodge tricky definitional questions
about when a speaker’s own actions should count as “speech,”
by focusing instead on any nefarious government motive in
65
suppressing the actions. But in so doing, negative theory then
creates a new line-drawing problem of its own. Negative theory
offers no meaningful limiting principles that would permit government to regulate speech under certain conditions. It also
does not elide the “what is speech” question entirely, as no free
speech problem arises if a government motive is to regulate
pure conduct and the law is applied in a speech-neutral way.
Thus the definitional question does not disappear, but instead
shifts from asking whether a particular activity is speech to
asking whether the government intends to target speech. In
any event, here we note the Court’s increasing reliance on negative theory to justify its free speech decisions, and that such
reliance, if taken seriously, adds support to the possibility of
First Amendment coverage of AI speech.
In sum, both positive and negative theories support the
idea of extending First Amendment coverage to strong AI. To
make these claims less abstract, take the following hypothet-

63. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
64. See Gey, supra note 30, at 21; see also Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 414 (1996) (emphasizing improper government
motive as the central offense to First Amendment values).
65. See, e.g., Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 8 (2016) (“[T]he government faces a heightened burden when it singles out speech.”).
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ical. A strong AI version of the Tolstoy-bot writes long, intricate, socially astute novels about the 2016 election cycle, in66
spired by the work of Leo Tolstoy. The works cannot be traced
in any way to a human author or programmer. In our hypothetical, they are the creative work solely of our Tolstoy-bot AI.
To a traditional democratic self-governance theorist, such
novels would be covered by the First Amendment to the extent
67
that they contribute to public discourse and political debate.
To Post, they would be covered both because they are public
discourse, and because government restrictions on their publication would call into question for individual human citizens
68
the legitimacy of that governance regime. To Balkin, they
would be protected because readers of the novels could use the
69
books to dynamically construct a culturally situated self. To
marketplace-of-ideas theorists, the novels would be protected to
the extent they contribute to their readers’ search for “truth,”
70
knowledge, or enlightenment. To autonomy theorists, the novels would be protected because interference in their publication
would squelch readers’ autonomy, impinging on freedom of in71
formation-gathering, self-construction, and thought. And to
those taking the negative view of the First Amendment, the
novels would be protected from laws that arise from an illegitimate government motive, perhaps resulting from a desire to
squelch social criticism (or a deep hatred of long-form litera72
ture).
Only a theory that insists that speech has value solely insofar as it enhances human speakers’ and not listeners’ auton-

66. Joshua Barrie, Computers Are Writing Novels: Read a Few Samples
Here, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/novels
-written-by-computers-2014-11 (describing a 2008 “320-page novel [that] is a
variation of Leo Tolstoy’s ‘Anna Karenina,’ but worded in the style of a Japanese author called Haruki Murakami”).
67. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text (describing selfgovernance theories).
68. Our claim, not his. For a discussion of Post’s theory of freedom of expression, see supra note 34 and accompanying text.
69. Our claim, not his. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (describing Balkin’s theory of free speech).
70. To review the marketplace-of-ideas theory, see supra notes 42–43 and
accompanying text.
71. See supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text (explaining autonomy
theory).
72. See supra Part I.B (overviewing negative views of the First Amendment).
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73

omy cuts against this grain. The next Part therefore explores
the role—if any—of speakers’ autonomy, dignity, and emotion
in current First Amendment law.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT LAW AND ITS INATTENTION TO
SPEAKER HUMANNESS
First Amendment doctrine already protects speakers that
74
are not conventionally human. Corporations receive speech
75
protection as legal persons, and courts already have protected
algorithmic speech (as the product of human programmers, but
76
still). Nevertheless, the biggest hurdle to protecting the
speech rights of strong AI is the assertion that humanness
matters, or should matter, to First Amendment rights.
77
Humans are the quintessential language animal. We constantly construct ourselves out of layers of meaning, both pro78
duced and consumed. In all of these respects, language makes
us distinctive—it gives us a capacity to adapt, a fluidity “which
79
has no parallel among other animals.” Humans are the only
language animal, so realized. Human law, including constitutional law, was designed for this animal, and maps imperfectly
onto other animals, let alone onto inanimate machines.
If language is so essential to our existence as human beings, how can it be that legal protection for the use of language
does not turn on a speaker’s humanness? This Part addresses
why speaker humanness may not matter for purposes of our

73. See C. Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech,
84 IND. L.J. 981, 997 (2009) (arguing that free speech protections should not
apply to commercial speech because it “is not an exercise of freedom by morally significant flesh-and-blood individuals”).
74. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1183–85.
75. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365–66 (2010).
76. Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(characterizing search engine algorithmically produced results as “in essence
editorial judgments about which political ideas to promote”); see also Langdon
v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007); Search King, Inc. v. Google
Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 WL 21464568 (W.D. Okla. May 27,
2003).
77. See generally CHARLES TAYLOR, THE LANGUAGE ANIMAL: THE FULL
SHAPE OF THE HUMAN LINGUISTIC CAPACITY (2016) (describing how language
shapes the human experience).
78. Id. at 30–38. We also locate emotional meanings in the body—words
have meaning in part because they express a feeling that registers in our
physical beings. Id. at 247.
79. Id. at 339.
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contemporary First Amendment rights regime, even if one fo80
cuses on the expressive uniqueness of human beings.
A. WHAT ABOUT AUTONOMY AND DIGNITY?
The intuition that a speaker must be human to trigger
First Amendment coverage remains deeply felt for many reasons. If we protect speech to protect a speaker’s autonomy and
dignity, then it seems unimaginable to protect an AI that arguably has neither dignity nor autonomy interests. Even corporations, which fit less easily into constitutional garb, have humans within them.
Free speech theories that value speech for its role in furthering the autonomy of the speaker thus present significant
81
barriers to coverage for strong AI speakers. However, speaker
autonomy arguments face several difficulties. First, speaker
autonomy arguments must identify intrinsic qualities of moral
personhood that are unique to humans. As AI advances, the
gap between machines and humans may narrow in ways that
weaken this uniqueness claim. Second, and more fundamentally, insisting that humans alone possess intrinsic qualities of
moral personhood does not prove that those qualities should
82
matter for purposes of conferring free speech rights.
As discussed in Siri-ously 1.0, the personhood barrier for
First Amendment protections could be overcome if (1) we
change how we view protected “persons” for practical or theoretical reasons; or (2) AI came to function in ways that satisfied
83
our personhood criteria. We are seeing changes on both fronts.
Free speech theory has marched steadily away from a construction of legal personhood that views speakers solely through an
individual or animate lens, and now defines them in a practi84
cal, non-ontological sense. Under this view, and as discussed
80. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1178–82.
81. Id.
82. See Jason Iuliano, Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, 90 IND.
L.J. 47, 71 (2015) (“Two competing theories of personhood have dominated the
philosophical literature. The first account maintains that persons are distinguished by certain intrinsic characteristics, that there is some innate substance that captures personhood . . . . The second holds that persons are distinguished by certain external characteristics. According to this account, any
agent that performs in a certain manner qualifies as a person.”).
83. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1179–82.
84. See supra Part I; see also EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE
38 (2011) (“The defining hallmark of liberalism is that the ultimate unit of
moral value is the individual. For law, however, the unit to which rights and
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above, speech should be protected because it serves democratic
self-governance, or leads to better thinking, or even better
markets—not necessarily because the source of speech is a hu85
man speaker whose rights arise from innately human dignity.
Technological advances also may enable some AI to satisfy cer86
tain criteria for legal personhood. AI enhancements can blur
the line between AI rights and legal personhood by making the
relevant differences between computer programs and human
“programs” less stark and less significant. Speaker personhood
thus is not necessarily a First Amendment trump card, even
87
under autonomy theories.
duties attach is the legal person. The two are not the same. An individual has
legal personality, but so do a wide variety of groups, such as unions, corporations, communities, Indigenous people, and municipalities. The rule of law applies to legal persons, and not just to individuals.” (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted)).
85. See supra Part I. We note too that originalist arguments likely counsel
against giving free speech protection to machines; James Madison no doubt
envisioned that human speakers, not machines, would be covered by the First
Amendment. Those who ratified the amendment presumably did, too. Humanness, according to this originalist argument, is a necessary predicate for
First Amendment coverage. We offer two responses. First, the text of the free
speech clause makes no mention of a human speaker and instead restricts only “Congress,” suggesting the possibility that the original readers of the clause
understood it simply to constrain government rather than to protect speakers.
Second, the current Court boasts no more than two committed originalists
(Justice Thomas and perhaps the newly confirmed Justice Gorsuch), and strict
originalist arguments are unlikely to control its First Amendment doctrine.
86. Again, computers are increasingly self-directed or “autonomous.” See
infra note 122. Some forms of AI already are being designed in ways that may
afford them enhanced emotional intelligence and other features that narrow
the gap between humans and computers. See generally BLUEPRINT FOR AFFECTIVE COMPUTING: A SOURCEBOOK (Klaus R. Scherer et al. eds., 2010) (discussing affective computing, which is focused on theory and design of computers that can detect, respond to, and simulate human emotional states);
RAFAEL A. CALVO & DORIAN PETERS, POSITIVE COMPUTING: TECHNOLOGY FOR
WELLBEING AND HUMAN POTENTIAL (2014) (discussing how AI is being developed to detect nonverbal cues and otherwise be deployed to grasp and improve
human self-awareness and emotional well-being); ROSALIND W. PICARD, AFFECTIVE COMPUTING (1997); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE COMPUTING (Rafael A. Calvo et al. eds., 2015) (providing a reference for research in
the emerging field of affective computing, which addresses how affective factors influence interactions between humans and computers and how the latter
may be designed with social skills). These capacities are of particular relevance to us here.
87. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1181–82. The First Amendment is not the only area in which AI developments are pushing us to rethink
settled legal expectations about human actors. Copyright protections, which
would seem intuitively to vest in a human author, have long been justified in
the United States predominantly by a utilitarian consideration of incentives
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If anything, thinking about strong AI speech rights illustrates just how much human dignity and speaker autonomy
have been downplayed or erased from the First Amendment
equation. It forces us to attend to the ways in which law has
ignored the “missing something” problem that drives autonomy-based objections to AI rights.
We elaborate on the potential irrelevance of speaker personhood by turning to two specific objections some might have
to AI speech rights that relate to speaker humanness. First we
discuss whether a speaker must possess human emotions to
merit First Amendment coverage. Then we examine whether
free speech rights for AI would lead inexorably to coverage of
animals or other nonhuman speakers.
B. WHAT ABOUT EMOTIONS?
88

Emotion matters to human thought as well as to legal
rights and responsibilities. For example, shame is an important
piece of emotional hardware that assists humans in thinking
89
about the consequences of acts to which shame is linked. Refor the production of creative goods. The utilitarian justification for copyright
protection, combined with doctrinal development that lowers the originality
threshold, may also have made room for non-human authors in that area of
law (as much as the Copyright Office denies this possibility). Annemarie
Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially Intelligent Author,
2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 3–9; James Grimmelmann, Copyright for Literate
Robots, 101 IOWA L. REV. 657, 680 (2016) (“Robots that act indistinguishably
from humans can also be expected to respond indistinguishably from them in
response to legal pressures.”). But see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM
OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES § 306 (3d ed. 2014), http://www
.copyright.gov/comp3 (“The U.S. Copyright Office will register an original work
of authorship, provided that the work was created by a human being.”); Pamela Samuelson, Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47
U. PITT. L. REV. 1185, 1199–1200 (1986) (arguing that computers need no incentives to generate output and thus cannot be classified as authors). Again,
the entrance of AI into the legal system, like the entrance of any other disruptive technology, forces us to reconsider underlying theory and changes the
conversation in ways that reveal an increasing utilitarian bent, where we look
to costs and incentives or systemic governance justifications, such as restricting governmental overreach.
88. As emotion theorist Silvan Tomkins has put it, “Reason without affect
would be impotent, affect without reason would be blind.” SILVAN S. TOMKINS,
AFFECT, IMAGERY, CONSCIOUSNESS: VOL. I: THE POSITIVE AFFECTS 112 (1962).
For a compelling account of the interaction of cognition and emotion see
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF
EMOTIONS 454 (2001) (“Some emotions are at least potential allies of, and indeed constituents in, rational deliberation.”).
89. For a discussion of the psychological literature on shame and how it
may bear on law, especially on government use of shaming penalties, see
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morse is a factor in determining whether a person who has violated the law should be punished, and to what extent, and to
whether the harms to the victim have been properly acknowl90
edged. As Martha Nussbaum has said, “[L]aw without appeals
to emotion is virtually unthinkable . . . . [T]he law ubiquitously
91
takes account of people’s emotional states.” Fear of repercussions—loss of status, compromised interpersonal bonds, economic losses, freedom, self-respect, even death—all factor into
how law works to constrain human behavior.
Computers, at present, lack these and other relevant emotional capacities in ways that make them awkward legal rights
bearers at best. AI speakers are incapable of assuming emotional responsibility for the harms that they cause. Even the
most emotionally unintelligent humans surpass AI in this respect.
Emerging developments in affective computing, though,
92
may challenge the casual assumption that AI lacks feelings.
For one thing, human emotions are, according to some theorists, themselves “adaptations, well-engineered software modules that work in harmony with the intellect and are indispen-

MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE
LAW (2004) (discussing the links between disgust, shame, and law); Dan M.
Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075,
2086–91 (2006) (amending his earlier work and concluding government shaming may have too many negative consequences to warrant its use); Toni M.
Massaro, The Meanings of Shame: Implications for Legal Reform, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 645, 655–73 (1997) (discussing psychological literature on
shame and its relevance to government shaming); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1823–36 (2001) (discussing
how shaming works and the implications for shaming sanctions in corporate
arenas); James Q. Whitman, What’s Wrong with Inflicting Shaming Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1060–68 (1998) (discussing risks of government
shaming, especially that government thereby assigns punishment function to
mob justice).
90. See AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 107–14 (2004) (discussing the role of
remorse in accepting responsibility for misdeeds and making reparations).
91. NUSSBAUM, supra note 89, at 5. See generally THE PASSIONS OF LAW
(Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (collecting essays on emotions and law).
92. “[A]ffective computing” describes the interdisciplinary process of designing computer systems and devices that can recognize, interpret, simulate,
and process human affects. That capacity is expanding. See DAVID ROSE, ENCHANTED OBJECTS: DESIGN, HUMAN DESIRE, AND THE INTERNET OF THINGS
167 (2014) (explaining that computers “can sense sound, light, touch, many
kinds of movement, biometric data such as heart rate and fingerprints, liquid
flow, barometric pressure, radiation, temperature, proximity, and location” as
emotional cues); see also supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing affective computing).
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sable to the functioning of the whole mind.” That is, the more
we learn about human brains and the interplay of emotion and
reason, the more humans may look like extraordinarily complex computers. Emotions also may be means to an end—
94
“mechanisms that set the brain’s highest-level goals.” If thinking and feeling go hand in hand in this way for humans, then a
brilliant thinking machine also may be able to “feel” in ways
akin to humans.
More centrally, this thought experiment reveals that
speaker human attributes—including speaker emotions—are
not necessary to contemporary First Amendment law. Free
speech law pays extraordinarily little attention to speakers’
emotional intelligence. The freedom of speech umbrella covers
the least empathic speaker among us, no less than the exquisitely sensitive. Members of the Westboro Baptist Church are
protected when they picket the funerals of soldiers and display
signs proclaiming “God Hates Fags” and “Thank God for Dead
95
Soldiers.” First Amendment protections apply to racist, homophobic, sexist, blasphemous, or otherwise cruel postings on Facebook pages or other social media sites, despite the grave emo96
tional harms they may inflict.
Courts likewise do not inquire into the emotional capacities
of a corporation when it exercises its First Amendment free97
doms. And when the law focuses solely on bad government
motives regarding speech suppression rather than on whether
protected speech in fact occurred, the speaker’s actual autonomy and human attributes drop out of the picture altogether.
The primary focus is on the government and its antagonism
towards speech, not on any actual human speaker herself or itself.
93. STEVEN PINKER, HOW THE MIND WORKS 370 (1997).
94. Id. at 373; see also George Johnson, Consciousness: The Mind Messing
with the Mind, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://nyti.ms/29quHMK (referencing Princeton neuroscientist Michael Graziano as suggesting that “consciousness is a kind of con game the brain plays with itself. The brain is a computer
that evolved to simulate the outside world. Among its internal models is a
simulation of itself—a crude approximation of its own neurological processes”).
95. Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 448 (2010).
96. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014)
(discussing cyberharassment); see also Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton,
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1435, 1437–39 (2011) (discussing cyber harassment’s move to popular social media sites).
97. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (making no inquiry into the emotional capacities of the Citizens United organization).
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The darker aspect of a free speech theory that emphasizes
boundless expressive autonomy—i.e., that it places a constitutional right in the hands of some speakers who use the right
recklessly, stupidly, immaturely, coarsely, even insanely—has
98
not gone unnoticed. On the contrary, the unlikeable, irresponsible speaker who hurts others feelings is historically central to
American free speech law. Early cases such as Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, which defines the unprotected class of
99
“fighting words,” developed out of a sense that in the speech
realm at least, hurt feelings are subordinated to both cultural
100
pluralism and individualism. We protect the speaker who
feels no compunction about his wounding words because linedrawing around emotional harms is seen as anti-pluralistic.
Even if strong AI proves to be better than the worst of human speakers, and even if strong AI never matches the best of
human speakers in terms of emotional intelligence and grace,
AI’s free speech rights may not hinge on either capacity. What
will matter—at least under current theory and doctrine—is
whether AI says something listeners should hear, or something
that government should not be allowed to silence.
C. WHAT ABOUT OTHER NONHUMAN “SPEAKERS”?
Extending free speech coverage to AI raises powerful slip101
pery slope concerns. Would the extension of First Amendment
98. As Zechariah Chafee once said, free speech not only protects the noble
dissenter, but also “loud-mouthed unattractive men whose evidence and ideas
are rather worthless.” ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY
113 (2d ed. 1956); see also Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of
Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 63–64 (1987) (describing some plaintiffs in public employee free speech cases as “whistle blowers, whiners, and weirdos” who not only violate workplace discourse norms in
ways that prompt employer discipline, but then take the more aggressive steps
of suing and claiming retaliation).
99. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
100. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 299, 305
(1988) (characterizing a First Amendment question as “a question that involves the obligations of a legal order in a heterogeneous society comprised of
diverse and competitive groups,” and identifying three kinds of law: “assimilationist law strives toward social uniformity by imposing the values of a dominant cultural group; pluralist law safeguards diversity by enabling competing
groups to maintain their distinct perspectives; individualist law rejects group
values altogether in favor of the autonomous choices of individuals”).
101. A related slippery slope concern asks what constitutional rights other
than free speech might extend to AI. Again, we take care to focus only on the
possibility of free speech rights for strong AIs, and not on any other set of con-
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coverage to AI similarly require coverage of other nonhuman
102
speakers? At one discussion of AI speech rights, an audience
member asked whether these arguments had a logical stopping
103
point that would exclude her cat from free speech coverage.
Cats and other domestic animals communicate with their humans in multiple ways that may qualify as an intent to communicate reasonably understood as such, especially with respect to needs that they want the humans to fulfill. Similar and
perhaps stronger arguments attach to the communication of
104
dolphins and nonhuman primates.
We offer several observations in response to these slippery
slope concerns. First, the ease with which autonomous AI
speakers fit into current free speech theory and doctrine says
more about First Amendment theory and doctrine than it does
about changes in technology, or our understanding of animals.
Extending rights to AI thus might force courts and other
decisionmakers to reexamine arguments that free speech and
other constitutional rights should apply to other potential
105
rights bearers, including animals. We look forward to that
106
provocative conversation, should it occur.
stitutional rights. Indeed, not all rights are, or should be, necessarily available
to all legal persons. For example, that a legal person has the right to sue and
be sued—or to speak—does not necessarily mean that it has, or should have,
the right to vote or a right to privacy. See Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 321 (2015) (“Of course corporations
are not genuine human beings and should not automatically receive all the
constitutional rights that human beings claim. At the same time . . . it is similarly obvious that corporations should be able to claim some constitutional
rights. So which ones, and when?”).
102. See generally FRANS DE WAAL, ARE WE SMART ENOUGH TO KNOW
HOW SMART ANIMALS ARE? (2016) (discussing ways in which many animals
have vast, still underappreciated, capacities that may bear on how law—
including free speech law—should treat them). We write this mindful of his
arresting examples of sweet potato-washing Japanese macaques, bottlenose
dolphins that buoyed a stunned fellow dolphin by carrying her on their bodies
and submerging their own blowholes beneath the water surface until she revived, and the surprising braininess of the octopus. Id. at 52, 133, 246–49.
103. Thanks to Sue Glueck for raising this question.
104. Ryan Calo asked whether arguments that the First Amendment covers AI speech also suggest First Amendment coverage for random acts of nature, like rogue waves that refigure sand on the beach to shape words that
government might want to erase. Calo posed the free speech hypothetical in
which waves on a beach (weirdly) formed symbols or words that humans interpreted as deeply offensive or frightening (or perhaps inspiring), and wondered whether a local government’s erasure of such markings to prevent potential negative impacts would present a First Amendment problem.
105. See Tilikum v. Sea World Parks & Entm’t, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 1259,
1262 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that the Thirteenth Amendment applies
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Second, a decision to extend First Amendment coverage to
AI speech does not inexorably lead to coverage of other nonhuman speakers. Animal communication skills are not evolving
107
nearly as rapidly as AI skills. Nor is the evolutionary arc of
animal language as amenable to human direction or crafting in
the very direct ways that the arc of AI language is. AI is human-designed and profoundly and exclusively human-centered
in terms of the needs it seeks to address. AI expression arguably will benefit human audiences more pointedly, pervasively,
and profoundly than a cat’s meows. Moreover, AI communication is deliberately supplanting human communication at
nodes (think finance, telecommunication, transportation, energy, computer-assisted research, health care, and defense) that
matter greatly to human well-being, safety, and knowledge.
A cat that is not in the mood to purr and leaves the room
with rump aloft will have little impact on humans’ fundamental
information bearings. Depending on the context, a computer
that refuses to interact or goes down unexpectedly may damage
human interests in disastrous ways. AI communication is often
designed to serve very central human information needs. To
solely to persons, not animals such as orcas); Nonhuman Rights Project v.
Presti, 124 A.D.3d 1334 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of chimpanzee on ground that the writ is only available
when it would lead to immediate release from custody in New York); Nonhuman Rights Project v. Lavery, 124 A.D.3d 148, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (rejecting argument for legal personhood for chimpanzees); Richard L. Cupp, Jr.,
Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, and Legal Personhood, 68
FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (considering but rejecting legal rights for animals on the ground that legal personhood is based on respect for dignity interests of persons as members of the human race, not on cognitive abilities);
see also Justin Marceau, If a Monkey Snaps a Selfie, Does He Own the Rights
to His Own Photograph?, QUARTZ (Aug. 26, 2016), http://qz.com/767163/naruto
-monkey-selfie-peta; David Post, The Monkey Selfie Is Back!, WASH. POST:
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/09/01/the-monkey-selfie-is-back/?utm_term=
.b360f38cf8b0 (discussing the monkey “selfie” and why he cannot be declared
the “author” of the image under copyright law). See generally STEVEN M. WISE,
RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS (2000) (arguing
that animals are more appropriately persons, not things). For a thoughtful critique of Wise’s approach that touches on the conceptual and practical difficulties of arguing by analogy from traditional rights bearers to new ones, see
Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights, 110 YALE L.J. 527, 532 (2000) (reviewing
STEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE (2000)) (“[C]ognition and rightsdeservedness are not interwoven as tightly as Wise believes . . . .”).
106. See DE WAAL, supra note 102, at 52.
107. See NICK BOSTROM, SUPERINTELLIGENCE 2–3 (2014) (discussing how
the future rate of growth of AI technologies is unclear, and that current
growth models may greatly underestimate pace of change).
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take but a few compelling examples, computer-generated information is crucial to air traffic control, a great deal of medical
care, and the functioning of the stock market. Much as humans
might like to know what cats, dolphins, octopuses, or capuchin
monkeys are really telling them, humans are not literally lost
108
or gravely imperiled if these meanings remain mysteries.
AI is designed to speak our language, and increasingly to
do so in forms that look like us, walk like us, and talk like us.
Animals, by contrast, generally do not participate in what hu109
mans understand to be genres of human communication. If
courts and other decisionmakers justify the protection of AI because of human listeners, then the value of AI speech to human
listeners is arguably higher than the value of animal
110
“speech.” A decision to extend First Amendment coverage to
AI speech thus may not require a decision to extend such coverage to other nonhuman speakers.
Another way to understand these distinctions is to return
to the doctrine. From a doctrinal perspective, extending First
Amendment coverage to AI speech does not necessarily require
the coverage of much of animals’ output, because what animals
produce often does not qualify as “speech” under the First
111
Amendment. The doctrine on expressive conduct, arising in
cases about burning flags and destroying draft cards, protects
conduct performed with an intent to create a particularized
112
message that is likely to be understood. Animals arguably
108. Cf. DE WAAL, supra note 102, at 234 (rejecting strong versions of human exceptionalism, and noting that “there is sound evidence that mental processes associated with consciousness in humans, such as how we relate to the
past and future, occur in other species as well” but conceding that we do not
yet know enough to map the consciousness differences precisely).
109. Animals have their own distinctive features, which may overlap with
human characteristics in ways that make them rich subjects of study as humans continue the hard work of understanding themselves. See MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, POLITICAL EMOTIONS: WHY LOVE MATTERS FOR JUSTICE 137–60
(2013) (discussing differences and similarities between animal and human
compassion).
110. See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 717 (2000) (“If the state were to prohibit the use of
[film] projectors without a license, First Amendment coverage would undoubtedly be triggered. This is not because projectors constitute speech acts, but because they are integral to the forms of interaction that comprise the genre of
the cinema.”).
111. Similarly, if a wave washing up on the beach manages to produce random patterns, those patterns are unlikely to be considered First Amendment
“speech.” See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (noting that the
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rarely do this. Some animal communication, of course, is reasonably understood to create particularized messages—think:
“feed me,” “someone is at the door,” or the more complex communication of primates. But the animal-human communication
relationship remains much thinner than the AI-human communication relationship in ways that still make it easier, at
least for now, to categorically exclude animal speakers from the
First Amendment fold.
III. DOCTRINAL AND PRACTICAL OBJECTIONS TO AI
FREE SPEECH COVERAGE
We have demonstrated the theoretical difficulty of placing
AI speakers wholly outside the First Amendment. A great deal
of computer speech shares similarities with the human speech
that courts already protect, especially when we emphasize expression’s value to listeners. Non-humanness does not necessarily pose any insurmountable theoretical obstacle to strong
AI rights.
The law, however, is more than theory, and there are arguably a host of practical and doctrinal hurdles to protecting
strong AI speech. This Part explains how both prevailing doctrine and practical concerns also fail to eliminate the possibility
of First Amendment coverage for AI speech, even while they
identify important challenges and questions yet to be addressed.
A. CAN AI SPEAKERS HAVE CULPABLE MENTAL STATES?
First Amendment law sometimes requires intent to cause
harm (or some other culpable mental state on the part of the
speaker) as a condition of imposing liability for speakers’ harm113
ful expression. Courts justify such a requirement in an effort
to protect valuable speech from the possible chilling effects of
114
over-regulating less culpably motivated speakers. But this
symbolism inherent in an object, the context of the situation, and an intention
of expression can combine to create a protected form of expression).
113. Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1172–85.
114. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (holding that advocacy
of illegal conduct is protected unless intentionally directed to inciting imminent illegal action); see also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80
(1964) (holding that false assertions of fact regarding public officials are protected absent the speaker’s malicious mental state); Leslie Kendrick, Speech,
Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1640 (2013) (arguing that a stricter standard of liability would cause over-deterrence of
speech).
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creates a problem if the doctrine were to insulate AI speakers
(but not human speakers) from liability because they lack
provably culpable mental states.
Say, for example, a computer produces defamatory
speech—i.e., false factual claims that damage its target’s reputation—about a public official. First Amendment doctrine currently requires a showing of the speaker’s actual malice before
even demonstrably false political attacks may become actiona115
ble. How might a court determine whether an AI speaker acted with knowledge of or reckless disregard for the falsity of its
assertions, or that it “entertained serious doubts as to the truth
116
of [its] publication”? If the culpable intent cannot be shown,
then liability arguably does not attach.
Rather than insulating AIs’ defamatory speech from liability altogether, courts could manage these complexities by altering the doctrine to prevent an AI windfall or otherwise mitigate
117
the harmful effects of defamatory AI speech. Even contemporary free speech doctrine, despite its growing emphasis on formalism over nuance, offers ways to address important regula118
tory concerns.
115. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80; see also Meg Leta Ambrose & Ben
M. Ambrose, When Robots Lie: A Comparison of Auto-Defamation Law, in
IEEE WORKSHOP ON ADVANCED ROBOTICS AND ITS SOCIAL IMPACTS 56, 57
(2014), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=7020980 (“[R]obots also serve as information and communication participants that may cause
social unrest and individual harm which current legal regimes will find challenging. . . . [E]merging robotic systems pose novel issues concerning defamation due to their unprecedented ability to experience the world and potential
to communicate that experience to humans.”).
116. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).
117. For an analysis of the difficulties that already exist with mapping defamation law onto new social media, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 164–85 (1999); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky &
RonNell Andersen Jones, Of Reasonable Readers and Unreasonable Speakers:
Libel Law in a Networked World, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 155, 156 (2016)
(discussing the unique implications that social media has for the malice rule);
Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515,
527–38 (2015) (discussing implications of new technologies for reputation law);
Robinson Meyer, Did Facebook Defame Megyn Kelly?: Which Is Another Way of
Asking: Can a Bot Commit Libel?, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 30, 2016), http://www
.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/08/did-facebook-defame-megyn-kelly/
498080 (discussing Facebook’s potential liability for a shift in the algorithm for
its trending feature, which promoted a fake story that claimed Megyn Kelly
endorsed Hillary Clinton for President).
118. See Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 369–
82 (2014) (discussing ways in which the Roberts Court has moved toward
greater formalism in its approach to free speech, but noting the many ways in
which existing doctrine still offers judges significant and necessary flexibility
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Indeed, our legal tradition has long had to find ways to
manage the challenges presented by new machines and other
technology. Copyright law provides one such example of law’s
adaptation to technology at the doctrinal edges. The concept of
vicarious liability, with its focus on a potentially liable person’s
benefit from and control of a copyright infringer, was initially
119
poorly suited for the age of mass filesharing. Software distributors benefit from filesharing in more indirect ways than
their physical world counterparts: through online advertisements, for example, instead of rent or direct kickbacks. The element of control presents similar doctrinal challenges: software
distributors can either easily control all users, exposing themselves to broad liability and accruing what can be high monitoring costs, or can create situations of willful blindness. Over
time, courts have (admittedly with serious struggles) figured
out doctrinal ways to ascribe secondary liability to software dis120
tributors. The sheer scale of filesharing, balanced against
fears of chilling technological development, resulted not in a refusal to apply copyright law to new technologies, but in doctrinal development that made room for complicated debates about
overarching policy concerns. Courts similarly may adapt First
Amendment doctrine on its edges to address the challenges
posed by AI speakers’ defamatory speech, even absent a provably culpable mental state.

to address context-specific concerns).
119. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261–62 (9th Cir.
1996) (explaining that the “concept of vicarious copyright liability . . . [is] an
outgrowth of the agency principles of respondeat superior”).
120. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913 (2005) (holding filesharing software company Grokster liable for inducing
copyright infringement); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 442 (1984) (explaining that for its maker to escape secondary liability, a
technology must be “capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses”);
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
filesharing software company Napster liable for user copyright infringement).
But see Am. Broad. Co. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2516 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“It will take years, perhaps decades, to determine which automated systems now in existence are governed by the traditional volitional-conduct
test and which get the Aereo treatment. (And automated systems now in contemplation will have to take their chances).”); Bruce E. Boyden, Aereo and the
Problem of Machine Volition, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 485, 499–505 (discussing
how technology muddies issues of responsibility in copyright infringement
cases).
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B. CAN AIS SUE OR BE SUED?
Some practically minded skeptics have pointed out the difficulties in determining how an AI speaker could sue to protect
its free speech rights, or be sued and punished for its imper121
missibly harmful speech. Here we offer an introduction to
how an AI might sue or be sued, though we recognize that significant challenges remain to be addressed.
Samir Chopra and Laurence White have contributed greatly to efforts to think about how to operationalize legal rights
122
and duties for AI. We again draw on their work in considering key practical questions that would arise should courts ex123
tend First Amendment coverage to AI speakers. Chopra and
White note, and we agree, that AI need not have identical
124
rights and obligations to humans. Additionally, legal frameworks can be developed that would enable AI to sue and be
sued. The existing category of “legal persons” already includes
entities that hold a variety of legal (including constitutional)
rights and duties—such as corporations, unions, municipalities,
125
and even sailing vessels. These rights-holders are legal persons, but do not possess human status.
121. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 46, at 1248–52.
122. See generally SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY
FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS (2011) (suggesting a framework in
which artificial agents are given legal personhood).
123. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1180–81.
124. For example, courts have treated corporations as holding “derivative”
First Amendment rights to speak in ways that inform and benefit natural persons, rather than holding rights for their own sake. See, e.g., Margaret M.
Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Constitutional
Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1678 (2015). Courts might similarly
treat strong AI speakers only as derivative rights-holders rather than holding
rights indistinguishable from those held by natural persons.
125. CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 122, at 157; see also Massaro & Norton,
supra note 6, at 1180–81 (discussing rights and duties of entities that are not
moral, natural, or human persons); Solum, supra note 46, at 1238–39 (explaining how the term “person” is often used as synonymous with “human” for
many purposes, but “[t]he question whether an entity should be considered a
legal person is reducible to other questions about whether or not the entity can
and should be made the subject of a set of legal rights and duties. The particular bundle of rights and duties that accompanies legal personhood varies with
the nature of the entity. Both corporations and natural persons are legal persons, but they have different sets of legal rights and duties”). For interesting
work speculating about the future of Bitcoin and how “independently wealthy
software” might sue and be sued, see Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 93 (2015); Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy
Software, and the Zero-Member LLC, 108 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 257 (2014).

2510

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:2481

As applied to AI, the first step in the progression of legal
rights might be to treat AIs as dependent, not independent, legal persons. This would permit their owners (or those who direct or are assigned responsibility for them) to be sued for their
allegedly harmful or otherwise illegal actions. As Chopra and
White observe, “If legal systems can accord dependent legal
personality to children, adults who are not of sound mind, corporations, ships, temples, and even idols, there is nothing to
prevent the legal system from according this form of legal per126
sonality to artificial agents.” Courts and regulators could follow precedent that currently applies to corporations to establish these legal arrangements.
The more complex and controversial step would be for AI to
be granted wholly independent legal personhood. Chopra and
White outline the criteria for independent legal personhood as
follows: an independent legal person must have intellectual capacity and rationality; the ability to understand legal obligations; susceptibility to punishment and enforcement; the ability
127
to form contracts; and the ability to control money. Sophisti128
cated AI could satisfy these criteria. Moreover, satisfaction of
the theoretical criteria for independent legal personhood would
enable those injured by AI speakers to pursue legal remedies
against AI.
But this does not mean these notions are static or that AI
may not close the gap between human cognition and machine
thinking and planning. Law could take into account the inanimate nature of the legal actor in crafting liability rules, in
framing the elements of torts such as defamation, or in defining
129
constitutional defenses to liability. With such adjustments,
More of these issues surely are nigh, as blockchain technology (on which
Bitcoin depends) makes its way to trade finance and elsewhere. See, e.g., Kim
S. Nash, Dun & Bradstreet Tests Blockchain for Trade Finance, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 14, 2016), http://on.wsj.com/2ekRlct.
126. CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 122, at 160. For example, AI might be
required to register and meet capital requirements necessary to meet its financial duties and enable those who contract with AI to be on fair notice of
AI’s economic capacities. Id. at 161–62.
127. Id. at 162–63.
128. Id. at 162–71.
129. See id. at 153–71, 186–91 (discussing various means by which strong
AI could be held legally accountable, including for damages); see also Ambrose
& Ambrose, supra note 115 (discussing possible adjustments in defamation
law as AI becomes more autonomous). The European parliament is ahead of
the curve on these matters, and has suggested regulations be drafted that may
include a form of “electronic personhood” for AI. See Alex Hern, Give Robots
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AI could be held legally accountable for its harms. Moreover, as
we already are seeing with weak AI that can generate news
130
stories that include false statements, the risk of defamatory
harm from strong AI is likely to be profound. Courts will be motivated to redress the harms and to make doctrinal moves necessary to do so. How might judicial remedies be crafted and enforced in such cases? AI cannot be imprisoned; but of course
131
neither can corporations. Instead, an AI might be physically
disabled, barred from future participation in certain economic
132
transactions, deregistered, or have its assets seized. Shallow
or empty-pocket AI actors may exist and thus limit the usefulness of damage remedies, but this is true of many judgmentproof human actors as well. Injunctive and declaratory relief
could be invoked against the AI speaker, just as it is invoked
against human actors. Again, adjustments within the doctrine
on speech protection could be made to account for the fact that
the speaker is a computer, not a human being.
As for rights enforcement, we can imagine scenarios—
especially given the interdependence of AI rights and listenerbased interests—in which AI legal rights organizations or other
humans interested in protecting valuable AI communication
would step in to assist AI with assertion of AI rights. Specialized AI lawyers could help implement legal rights and remedies. Third-party standing rules that apply in federal court
might allow interested human parties to assert the AI rights,
along with their own. The more important the information produced and controlled by AI becomes, the more likely it will be
that legal means of enforcing AI speech rights and responsibilities will be developed.
The question in all of these cases would be how to respond
to the rights and remedies needs, given the functionality and
capacities of the AI speaker. As the latter evolve, this would affect how rights and remedies are crafted and enforced. In fact,
considering the range of available punishments for AI might
lead to discussions of the theoretical purposes of punishment—
“Personhood” Status, EU Committee Argues, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/january/12/give-robots
-personhood-status-eu-committee-argues.
130. See Tim Adams, And the Pulitzer Goes to . . . a Computer, THE GUARDIAN (June 28, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/28/
computer-writing-journalism-artificial-intelligence.
131. See CHOPRA & WHITE, supra note 122, at 167 (comparing punishment
of AI to that available for a corporation).
132. Id. at 167–68.
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retribution, rehabilitation, constraint—much as considerations
of AI speech rights have led us to reexamine free speech theory
here.
Key to these practical concerns is that humanness is not
essential to legal personhood—even if, as surely will be the
case, human needs may inspire the move to AI legal personhood, and even if humans may be necessary aids to legal enforcement of AI rights. AI rights and remedies thus may be enforceable.
IV. POTENTIAL LIMITS ON AI FREE SPEECH COVERAGE
Among the most powerful objections to the notion of extending speech protections to strong AI is that such extension
lacks limiting principles. We agree that the hardest problem
lies here: If AI speech is covered by the First Amendment, how
can the government perform important regulatory functions in
the name of humans without running afoul of the First
Amendment?
This puzzle produces the greatest intellectual yield of the
AI thought experiment. The claims we advance are evidence of
an existing slippage problem: the Court’s contemporary free
speech theory and doctrine already make it difficult to articulate convincing limiting principles. By emphasizing either a
negative view of the First Amendment that seeks to constrain
133
the government’s dangerous ability to regulate speech or pos134
itive views that emphasize the value of speech to its listeners,
current doctrine supports the coverage of speech regardless of
its nontraditional source or form. Increasingly expansive First
Amendment theories and practice have already evolved in a
manner that permits further coverage extensions that may
133. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543–44 (2012) (restating
the rule from Ashcroft v. ACLU that the First Amendment prohibits government restriction of speech); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468–70
(2010) (“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”).
134. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 392–93 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“The [First] Amendment is written in terms of ‘speech,’ not
speakers. Its text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker, from
single individuals to partnerships of individuals, to unincorporated associations of individuals, to incorporated associations of individuals . . . .”); First
Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978) (“The inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend
upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual.”).
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seem exceedingly odd, counterintuitive, or even dangerous.
Current free speech law—which many now argue has invited
deployment of the First Amendment as an antiregulatory
136
tool —is the source of this challenge, rather than any technological change past, present, or future.
The choice to extend the First Amendment to cover new
sources and styles of speech inevitably involves both promise
and peril. Extending constitutional protection to private activity is often a double-edged liberty sword: the greater the power
of the private actor, the greater the risk that freedom for that
137
actor will constrain the freedom of other, less powerful actors.
If courts do extend First Amendment coverage to AI speakers, this move surely will invite calls for limiting principles. As
this Part explains, contemporary free speech doctrine contains
means by which courts could respond to dangers posed by AI
speakers, though each presents its own difficulties. In short, in-

135. See Christopher Robertson, The Tip of the Iceberg: A First Amendment
Right To Promote Drugs Off-Label, 78 OHIO ST. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017)
(discussing slippery slope implications of the increased use of free speech law
to block FDA legislation); Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of
First Amendment Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613, 1629 (2015) (“The
opportunistic lawyer or client seeking a way of fighting against some form of
regulation or prosecution can now have increased confidence that an argument
from the First Amendment will not be received with political scorn or doctrinal
incredulity.”); Philip J. Weiser, Law and Information Platforms, 1 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 33–35 (2002) (discussing concerns about how information industries may invoke free speech coverage in ways that may undermine regulatory goals).
136. For a sampling of the many thoughtful commentators who have discussed this trend, see Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1199, 1200 (2015) (“[W]hat has been called First
Amendment opportunism, where litigants raise novel free speech claims that
may involve the repackaging of other types of legal arguments [lead to] First
Amendment expansionism, where the First Amendment’s territory pushes
outward to encompass ever more areas of law.”); Robert Post & Amanda
Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 167 (2015)
(“It is no exaggeration to observe that the First Amendment has become a
powerful engine of constitutional deregulation. The echoes of Lochner are palpable [and likely to be heard] in matters ranging from public health to data
privacy.”); Rebecca Tushnet, COOL Story: Country of Origin Labeling and the
First Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 26 (2015) (“[T]he First Amendment has become the new Lochner, used by profit-seeking actors to interfere
with the regulatory state in a way that substantive due process no longer allows.”).
137. See, e.g., Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1149, 1191 (2008) (discussing the role search engines play as choke
points to access to information).
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terpreting the First Amendment to cover strong AI speakers
would not necessarily mean that human needs no longer matter to First Amendment analysis. In fact, such an interpretation may inspire more careful reflection about how to define
and mitigate the harmful effects of covered speech, while preserving its manifold benefits.
A. COVERING AI SPEECH BUT NOT ITS CONDUCT
The First Amendment covers speech, but not conduct. Even
under the most generous listener-centered view of the First
Amendment, government regulation of pure conduct triggers no
freedom of speech problem, and typically triggers mere rational
basis scrutiny. The government’s regulation of conduct that also has expressive qualities normally triggers a form of interme138
diate scrutiny. Current doctrine also poses a speaker intent
threshold that must be crossed: in general, only conduct that is
intended by the actor to communicate and that is reasonably
understood by onlookers to communicate normally qualifies as
139
“speech” for constitutional purposes.
AI behavior—like human behavior—may fall under all of
these categories: it may be speech, expressive conduct, or pure
conduct. First Amendment protections also extend beyond
speech and expressive conduct, to acts integral to well-accepted
140
communications media, and to corollary or penumbral rights
141
necessary for fundamental First Amendment protections.
Which category applies to a particular AI behavior will depend
both on the specific behavior in question and the context in
142
which government seeks to regulate it.
138. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968).
139. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (per curiam). We
say “normally” because we recognize that strong versions of a listener-centered
approach to speech threaten to swallow up Spence’s speaker intent requirement. If the coverage focus is solely on output usefulness to the listener, then
it becomes harder to see why speaker intent (like speaker shame, speaker dignity, or speaker humanness) matters at all. All useful information, however
created, should under current theory trigger the First Amendment. The AI
problem, though, does not create these issues; it highlights them and thus
might prompt courts to walk back this potentially boundless aspect of speech
coverage, or seek to mitigate its effects in the ways we identify, or in other
ways we may have missed.
140. See generally Post, supra note 110 (discussing how First Amendment
protections could extend to encryption source code used to communicate ideas).
141. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–83 (1965) (“Without those
peripheral rights, the specific rights would be less secure.”).
142. See Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 36, at 1194 (noting
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Because the speech/conduct distinction may provide a reason to deny First Amendment protection to some of what algorithms and machines produce, it already has triggered significant scholarly examination. Scholars have concluded that while
some machine outputs produced by present-day AI and other
technologies constitute speech or should otherwise receive pro143
tection, other outputs do not. Strong AI information practices
will similarly vary, and thus so will the determination of when
AI information products (from computer code to 3D-printed objects to music to carrying the information content of others) are
144
speech versus conduct.
that free speech treatment of information practices might vary depending on
whether the practice involves data collection, analysis, use, disclosure, or
sale); Margot E. Kaminski, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things
They Carry, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 57, 62–63 (2013) (discussing constitutional
implications of data recording); Seth F. Kreimer, Pervasive Image Capture and
the First Amendment: Memory, Discourse, and the Right To Record, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 335, 408–09 (2011) (arguing that the First Amendment protects a
right to record).
143. See Massaro & Norton, supra note 6, at 1186–88 (summarizing these
arguments). But see NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 84–90 (2015) (critiquing the “data is
speech” argument on grounds that it asks the wrong question and risks dooming too much worthy regulation); Kyle Langvardt, The Doctrinal Toll of “Information as Speech,” 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 761, 790–801 (2016) (critiquing the
doctrinal trend of treating computer code and other code-dependent technologies as speech for First Amendment purposes on the ground that this coverage
will have the eventual effect of diluting protection of core First Amendment
speech). This obviously is not a new challenge, as free speech theorists have
long struggled over the evasive (and ultimately vanishing) line between speech
and conduct, even as they recognize the line still matters. The “computer outputs-as-speech versus conduct” debate provides a modern application of an enduring and well-rehearsed characterization problem that is central to free
speech theory and practice.
144. An example of how context matters arose in the recent controversy
over whether broadband providers could be treated as common carriers. U.S.
Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016). The court rejected the
compelled speech objections of the providers on the ground that the providers
covered by the regulation exercised no editorial control over the content, and
thus were not engaging in speech themselves. Id. at 741. The court stated as
follows:
The Supreme Court has explained that the First Amendment comes
“into play” only where “particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements,” that is, when an “intent to convey a particularized message [is] present, and in the surrounding circumstances the
likelihood [is] great that the message would be understood by those
who viewed it,” [t]he absence of any First Amendment concern in the
context of common carriers rests on the understanding that such entities, insofar as they are subject to equal access mandates, merely facilitate the transmission of the speech of others rather than engage in
speech in their own right.
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We do not distinguish among these products here. We
merely note that covering AI speech under the First Amendment will not insulate all of its outputs as speech, any more
than treating humans as rights-bearing speakers converts all
human behavior to speech, or insulates all of their speech outputs from government regulation.
B. PROTECTING LISTENERS AND OTHER HUMANS FROM
HARMFUL AI SPEECH
Even when an AI information product is covered as speech,
the government still may be able to regulate in the name of certain kinds of harms. In other words, even when courts recognize speech as covered by the First Amendment, this does not
always mean that courts will protect such speech from the gov145
ernment’s regulation. Courts will likely bring the constitutional hammer down differently on some AI informational
products than on others, based on the type of information prod146
uct, context, and the nature of the harms at stake. Courts
might be persuaded that government regulation of covered AI
speech meets intermediate and sometimes even strict scrutiny
where the harms of AI speech appear grave enough and the
regulations are sufficiently tailored.
A number of thoughtful commentators have documented
the potential harms of algorithmic speech products, due to
147
computers’ jaw-dropping speed and reach. These harms include deception, coercion, and discrimination. Strong AI will
only deepen these concerns.

Id. (citations omitted); see also Stuart Minor Benjamin, Transmitting, Editing,
and Communicating: Determining What “Freedom of Speech” Encompasses, 60
DUKE L.J. 1673, 1689–91 (2011) (arguing that mere transmission is not
speech).
145. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the distinction
between speech that is covered and how much protection speech will receive).
146. See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski, Privacy and the Right To Record, 97
B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4) (on file with authors) (“My
central claim is that the contours of the protected right to record are defined
by the privacy harms that the right potentially causes. Understanding the
right to record is possible only by properly articulating the privacy interests at
stake. This claim stands even as the Supreme Court in recent cases has repeatedly disavowed balancing speech against other nonspeech harms.”).
147. See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Unfair and Deceptive Robots, 74 MD. L.
REV. 785, 790–96 (2015) (describing how robots’ speech may include fraud,
manipulation, and invasions of privacy); Wu, supra note 12, at 1496–1503 (describing the range of potential harms of computer-generated speech that invite
regulation).
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For one thing, strong AI will have social valence: AI may
appear to be a real social actor in ways that trigger and manip148
At the same time, even
ulate intrinsic human reactions.
strong AI will likely still lack human emotions, sensitivity to
social nuance, or the ability to feel shame. A listener may intuitively trust AI as though it were a human actor, without understanding the differences or risks at hand. The field of Human
Robot Interaction (HRI) specifically studies how humans react
to robots, and how such reactions may be deliberately triggered
149
by machine design.
As discussed in Part II.B, an AI speaker’s lack of emotions
150
may not prevent its coverage under the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, AIs’ inability to internalize complex social cues or
feel shame or equivalently binding emotions might lead to a
greater government interest in regulating AI speech, based on
a greater likelihood, or greater impact, of its harms to listeners.
151
When Hello Barbie tries to get a child to buy her a new outfit,
the government’s regulatory interest might well take into account both Barbie’s canny ability to manipulate the child’s attachment and emotions, and Barbie’s inhuman inability to feel
any guilt about doing so. Combined, these features may mean
that Hello Barbie as a speaker may threaten significant and
categorically distinctive harm to a child, and that the harm she
causes over time may be different in degree or even—if such interactions, for example, prove to be physiologically addictive by

148. Calo, supra note 16, at 545 (discussing how humans react to anthropomorphic robots).
149. Laura Dattaro, Bot Looks Like a Lady, SLATE (Feb. 4, 2015), http://
www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/02/robot_gender_is_it_
bad_for_human_women.html; Margot E. Kaminski, What the Scarlett Johansson Robot Says About the Future, SLATE (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.slate.com/
articles/technology/future_tense/2016/04/what_the_scarlett_johansson_robot_
says_about_the_future.html (“Robot designers know we respond to anthropomorphic features . . . . They study the ways, both for good and for bad, that robot design can affect or elicit human behavior. In one study, men were more
likely to donate money to a female robot. In another, users disclosed more or
less information about dating, based on whether a robot was male or female.
This is no doubt true of race, as well; most robots currently have a Eurocentric
design.”).
150. See supra notes 88–100 and accompanying text (discussing the fact
that emotional capacity of the speaker is not part of First Amendment analysis).
151. See Irina D. Manta & David S. Olsen, Hello Barbie: First They Will
Monitor You, Then They Will Discriminate Against You. Perfectly, 67 ALA. L.
REV. 135, 136–37, 179 n.232 (2015) (discussing how built-in hardware and
software permits these devices to interact with other devices).
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design—in kind from those that a human speaker might in152
flict.
Of course, were courts to consider seriously this harm-onstilts aspect of AI speech, they also may be compelled to revisit
their profound agnosticism about comparably devastating effects when the speaker is a shameless or exceptionally cruel
human. This is yet another way in which AI speech problems
can shed new light on current doctrine and theory.
Adding to the potential harms of AI speech, computer programs are known to be far from neutral sources or decisionmakers. Bias and discrimination may be built into programs,
whether intentionally or accidentally; technology is not value153
The possibility that AI speech
neutral, but value-based.
threatens significant harms to human listeners through such
discrimination suggests a strong governmental interest in regulation. Much as free speech doctrine has made room for the
regulation of harassing speech that deprives its targets of employment and educational opportunities, so too may it make
room for regulation of AI speech to further the end of prevent154
ing discrimination. Judicial limits on AI speech will depend
on what AI speech does (and how, and to whom).
Courts already attend to the harms that expression poses
to listeners, as current doctrine recognizes a number of speech
environments in which listeners’ First Amendment interests
are paramount. Listeners’ interests can justify expression’s
152. See, e.g., Zoe Kleinman, Are We Addicted to Technology?, BBC (Aug.
31, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33976695.
153. See Batya Friedman & Helen Nissenbaum, Bias in Computer Systems,
14 ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INFO. SYS. 330 (1996); see also FRANK PASQUALE,
THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY
AND INFORMATION 29–35 (2015) (expressing concerns about data-driven society, given the opacity of data’s origins and destinations, the risk of bias and error within them, and possible cascade effects if information in one piece of
software is repeated in systems throughout the economy); Solon Barocas &
Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677
(2016); Kim, supra note 19 (noting that data and algorithms can discriminate);
Kate Crawford, Artificial Intelligence’s White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June
25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial
-intelligences-white-guy-problem.html (“Sexism, racism and other forms of
discrimination are being built into the machine-learning algorithms that underlie the technology behind many ‘intelligent’ systems that shape how we are
categorized and advertised to.”).
154. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2295, 2298 (1999) (discussing how the law should adapt to incentivize employers to make the workplace less hostile to less-powerful employees).
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First Amendment coverage, where such coverage serves listeners’ autonomy, enlightenment, and self-governance interests.
But sometimes listeners’ interests call for the regulation—not
just the protection—of speech. Courts thus might uphold narrowly tailored restrictions on AI speech to privilege human listeners’ interests in informed choices, or in avoiding the harms
155
of coercion, deception, or discrimination. If coverage of AI
speech is based in large part on listeners’ interests in that
speech, then the government may be able to regulate the
speech to protect human listeners when the interests of the AI
speaker and human listener conflict.
As an example, recall that the Court has explained that
commercial speech is worthy of First Amendment protection
156
because of its informational value to consumers as listeners.
Commercial speech that is false, misleading, or related to an
illegal activity frustrates listeners’ informational interests and
thus can be banned outright without running afoul of the First
157
Amendment. For related reasons, courts have permitted the
government substantial leeway to require commercial speakers
to make truthful disclosures because such disclosures often
158
serve listeners’ informational interests.
As another example, courts often permit the regulation of
professionals’ speech to their patients and clients by prohibiting lies and misrepresentations to such listeners and by requir-

155. See Norton, supra note 14, at 55–60 (explaining how First Amendment
theory and doctrine often support the content-based regulation of speech in
certain relationships where listeners experience information or power disadvantage or are otherwise comparatively vulnerable).
156. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (“[T]he extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is justified principally by the value to consumers of
the information such speech provides.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizen Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 763–64 (1976) (emphasizing the
value of “the free flow of commercial information” to individual consumers and
the public more generally).
157. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 562–64 (1980).
158. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (holding that disclosure requirements that
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing consumer deception do not violate commercial speakers’ First Amendment rights). The Court
applies intermediate scrutiny to laws regulating truthful and non-misleading
commercial speech on the premise that such speech—although still of relatively low value—can helpfully inform individuals about their choices in the commercial realm. Id.
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ing truthful disclosures of those listeners’ options and risks. A
number of commentators have proposed similar approaches in
the information technology context, suggesting the regulation
of those information entities to which internet audiences en160
trust important information or functions. Courts also have
protected listeners under the “captive audience” doctrine, which
161
applies when listeners cannot avoid or escape speech.
Listener-based justifications would not mean limitless government power to adopt the kinds of speech regulation the
Court historically has found most suspect. The government
might be tempted to censor critical or inconvenient AI speech
for malign motives that have long invoked First Amendment
concerns. In those cases, listener interests and negative theory
would align to bar the government’s efforts to target AIs’ viewpoint for censorious purposes, as is the case when the government conducts viewpoint-based regulation of human speech.
Drawing the line between these two scenarios—when listener and AI speaker interests align, and when they are in tension—will at times be difficult. Indeed, our AI thought problem
exposes this difficulty vividly. Contemplating the possibility of

159. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 248–50 (2013).
The role of the First Amendment as a brake on occupational licensing has
been a source of considerable recent scholarly attention. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Free Speech, Occupational Speech, and Psychotherapy, 44 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 681 (2016); Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238
(2016); Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First Amendment, 128
HARV. L. REV. F. 183 (2015); Eugene Volokh, Professional-Client Speech and
the First Amendment, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 20, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokhconspiracy/wp/2015/11/20/
professional-client-speech-and-the-first-amendment.
160. See, e.g., Balkin, Information Fiduciaries, supra note 36, at 1186 (“Because of their special power over others and their special relationship to others, information fiduciaries have special duties to act in ways that do not harm
the interests of the people whose information they collect, analyze, use, sell,
and distribute. . . . And because of their different position, the First Amendment permits somewhat greater regulation of information fiduciaries than it
does for other people and entities.”); Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 903–04
(describing the “inescapable information asymmetry between users and search
engines” that should be understood to trigger duties of loyalty and care); Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431, 462 (2016) (“Trust in information relationships requires an affirmative obligation of honesty to correct misinterpretations and to
actively dispel notions of mistaken trust.”).
161. Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled
Listening, 89 B.U. L. REV. 939, 946 (2009) (“[T]he question is not whether the
audience can avoid the message by leaving a particular location . . . but
whether they should have to.”).

2017]

SIRI-OUSLY 2.0

2521

AI speakers may lead to a more careful identification of the role
of listeners’ interests in all free speech puzzles, not just those in
which AI is the speaker.
Finally, our AI thought experiment illuminates a longcentral and recurring problem in First Amendment doctrine:
how to distinguish speech-related from non-speech-related
162
harms. In the case of expressive conduct, such as draft cardburning, the government can often regulate expression as long
as it aims the regulation at a non-speech-related harm, and ad163
equately tailors its attempt. For example, the government
cannot regulate flag-burning to prevent “the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable,” but could regulate burning flags and other ob164
jects where fire causes physical harm to others.
Many of the information products that AI produce likely
will be characterized not as pure speech, but as expressive conduct or something similar, much as computer code has been
subjected to forms of intermediate scrutiny to distinguish pro165
tected expression from its regulable non-speech impacts. If
the government attempts to regulate such mixed-impact information products, then the question becomes what counts as a
speech-related (and thus content-based and censorious) motive,
and what does not. Does privacy count as a speech-related interest? Does cybersecurity? Can the government prevent Hello
Barbie from doing a particular dance, or making particular

162. See TRIBE, supra note 10; Brown, supra note 10; see also Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 407 (1989) (“[W]here ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms, we have limited the applicability of
O’Brien’s relatively lenient standard to those cases in which ‘the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression.’” (citations omitted)).
163. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381–82 (1968).
164. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414; id. at 403 (“If the State’s regulation is not
related to expression, then the less stringent standard we announced in United States v. O’Brien for regulations of noncommunicative conduct controls. If it
is, then we are outside of O’Brien’s test, and we must ask whether this interest
justifies Johnson’s conviction under a more demanding standard.” (citations
omitted)).
165. See, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking Speech: Informational
Speech and the First Amendment, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 795, 816 (2013)
(“[C]ourts have sometimes turned to an intermediate standard of scrutiny
arising out of United States v. O’Brien as the basis of an analytical framework
in cases involving code.”).
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movements, or require particular elements in her design in the
166
name of preventing injury?
This is, again, not an AI-specific problem. Recent cases
have complicated the line between speech-related (or contentbased) regulation and permissible non-speech-related regula167
tion. Yet the government clearly can regulate expressive conduct under intermediate scrutiny to prevent physical harms to
others. Extending First Amendment coverage to AI speech thus
would not disable the government from regulating such speech
to address physical harms, such as crashing into others, causing particularly loud noises, or otherwise putting users at physical risk. Current doctrine suggests, however, that naming the
subject of regulation (e.g., “this regulation applies to pharmaceutical companies’ AI”) poses the risk that the regulation will
be characterized as content-based, and thus inappropriately
168
censorious. Other recent doctrine, however, suggests the government can name and thus target particular physical spaces
for regulation (like the physical areas around abortion providers or embassies), when expressive conduct or even pure speech
negatively impacts the behavior of others in that space for rea169
sons unrelated to the content of the speech.
Distinguishing regulations that address speech-related
harms from those that address non-speech-related harms is a
central free speech question of the algorithmic age that our
thought experiment helps illuminate. Extending speech protection to strong AI does not make all information that AI produces immune from regulation. It instead highlights the linedrawing work courts already must do to distinguish appropriate government regulation from censorious attempts.
Contemporary free speech law offers courts opportunities
for limiting the negative impact of AI expression even if they
wrap AI speakers into the constitutional fold. Yet the first
166. See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289–96 (2000) (applying
the test from O’Brien to a city ordinance prohibiting nude dancing because
nude dancing can be a form of expression).
167. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015) (invalidating an Arizona law that set restrictions on sign size based on whether the signs were
“Temporary Directional Signs,” “Ideological Signs,” or “Political Signs” as content-based); Sorrell v. IMS Health, 564 U.S. 522 (2011) (subjecting a Vermont
statute, which prevented pharmacies from selling client data to markets, to
heightened scrutiny due to its burden on speech).
168. IMS Health, 564 U.S. at 563–71 (finding that the particularity of the
regulation contributed to the finding that it was content-based).
169. Kaminski, supra note 146, at 53–56.
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move of granting AI speakers First Amendment coverage would
be a powerful one. It would place AI speech into the constitutional rights box, where government regulations typically face
elevated judicial scrutiny. Full protection of such speech from
the government’s regulation may not inexorably follow, but the
government would bear the weighty burden of justifying its
regulation.
Our point is this: insofar as a primary basis for protecting
AI speech rests on the value of expression to human listeners,
free speech protection for strong AIs need not rob the First
Amendment of a human focus. Absent a human speaker, government still may attend to the dangers to listeners and other
humans. First Amendment coverage need not mean protection
in all instances. The prospect of free speech rights for strong AI
speakers might encourage useful clarification of the roles of
human listeners and of speech harms in U.S. free speech theory
and doctrine today.
CONCLUSION
We have explained how foundational free speech theory
and doctrine present surprisingly few barriers to First
Amendment coverage of strong AI speech. In so doing, we also
have considered the powerful counterarguments to such coverage.
The assertion that strong AI speakers might be covered by
the First Amendment makes many uncomfortable, perhaps justifiably so. Some worry that in a system of rights, humanness
does—or at least should—matter. Others fear that a failure to
insist on humanness means that free speech rights must also
extend to our cats and dogs. More practically minded critics
point out the difficulties in determining how an AI could sue (to
vindicate its free speech rights) or be sued (for the harm inflicted by its regulated speech). Still others observe the challenges
that would arise in areas of First Amendment law that focus on
a speaker’s mental state in determining coverage or liability.
We take these concerns seriously. Although we conclude
that none of them settles the matter, we also agree that uncertainties will and should remain.
Failing to extend the First Amendment to cover AI speech
invites the risk that government will suppress such speech in
ways that deprive human listeners of valuable expression or
otherwise compromise important free speech interests. At the
same time, AI speech can pose substantial dangers to those
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same human listeners through its potential power, speed, and
scope. Free speech theory and doctrine can thus provide support for the regulation, as well as the protection, of strong AI
speakers. Courts may craft adjustments to doctrine to address
such expression’s potential harms, as well as its value, to human listeners. Such challenges are neither altogether new nor
necessarily insuperable. Legal regimes have long adapted to
the pressures of emerging technologies.
We close by turning the AI thought experiment on its head:
What does the prospect of First Amendment coverage of strong
AIs’ speech teach us about the limits and possibilities of current free speech law?
Among other things, it forces us to revisit questions about
whether and when courts should permit government to address
important interests in compensating and preventing the
regulable harms of expression without unduly treading on free
speech toes. The steady extension of free speech coverage to areas once thought to be immune from First Amendment scrutiny
has exacerbated this longstanding challenge, and our AI
thought experiment shows some of the challenges yet to come.
The hardest judicial work likely will lie here.
The challenges posed by coverage of AI speech may encourage the Court to build on listener-centered rationales to derive limiting principles within zones where free speech coverage applies. If it cares about listeners—and this Court plainly
does—it may consider how information-regulation policies can
both enhance and compromise listeners’ autonomy, enlightenment, and self-governance interests long thought to lie at the
core of the First Amendment.
Finally, we have described the logical implications of the
Court’s existing First Amendment framework, but have not insisted on its inevitability or even its wisdom. The normative
and practical difficulties in extending free speech rights to
strong AI speakers may force reexamination of the contemporary turn in free speech law and theory that makes future coverage of AI speech plausible. As AI evolves, human judges and
policymakers must muddle through the unfolding challenges
and find means to address them. Future constitutional law
scholars then will debate the merits of their handiwork (perhaps aided by AI enhancements in conducting their anal170
yses). However this work develops, it must be mindful of the
170. Stacy Liberatore, Your AI Lawyer Will See You Now: IBM’s ROSS Be-
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escalating power of AI over information that humans need to
survive. The information stakes already are extremely high,
and quickly mounting. We should start thinking—Siri-ously—
about the implications of AI advances for a variety of legal domains, including freedom of expression.

comes World’s First Artificially Intelligent Attorney, DAILY MAIL (May 13,
2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3589795/Your-AI-lawyer
-IBM-s-ROSS-world-s-artificially-intelligent-attorney.html.

